Ever since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Communist Party of China CCP has used the historical memory of WWII to legitimize its rule. Exactly how the historical conflict gets framed, and which parts of it are highlighted while others get omitted, has been subject to dramatic changes – just like China itself – as the different CCP leaderships adjusted and readjusted their agendas, domestic and international politics, and their imagining of what this xīn zhōngguó – “New China” – should mean.
The Side-lined History of China’s WWII Experience
The history of WWII in China is not very well known in Europe. At the turn of the century, China was undergoing severe societal and political turmoil. Military losses, internal rebellions and colonial interventions contributed to the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912. What followed in the Republican Era was above all a struggle of establishing China as a modern nation state. Among the disintegration of Chinese territory into areas controlled by local warlords, two major political versions of what this new system should look like emerged in form of the Nationalist Party, which was the ruling party of the first republican government and actively pushed for a unification of China, and the Communist Party. These increasingly incompatible blueprints for the political direction of China escalated into a civil war between these two movements in 1927.
In the meantime, Japan intensified its colonial expansion in East Asia, annexing Korea in 1910 and Manchuria – the North-eastern part of China – starting from 1931. With the increased awareness of Japanese ambitions to take over the rest of China, Nationalists and Communists agreed to put their conflict on hold and join forces to wade off the Japanese aggression in 1936. Soon after the establishment of this “Second United Front”, Japan launched a full-scale invasion of China in July 1937, marking the beginning of an active and brutal warfront which reached its finale only in 1945. Being the official representatives of Chinese state, the Nationalist armies primarily lead the classic frontline warfare, while the Communist forces engaged the Japanese through guerrilla tactics.
Yet crippled by years of unrest and civil conflict, further complicated by intensifying clashes between the Nationalists and the Communists, the Chinese did not see much success in halting Japanese advance throughout the Chinese territory. Important to note here is the amount of civilian suffering throughout the war years – the Japanese army systematically committed mass atrocities against civilians including massacres, looting, and sexual violence. Meanwhile, the civilians also suffered from the partisan violence of the re-emerging civil war, as well as from other realities of war such as the Nationalist army’s scorched earth strategy against the Japanese, which caused the largescale Henan province famine in 1942.
Though having become one of the Allied powers, China had a hard time convincing the other leaders to prioritize its aid, and it was only due to the atomic bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the USSR’s joining of the war against Japan in 1945 that WWII ended in China. But like in many other places around the world, this did not mean the end of hostilities – China immediately descended into a Civil War which reached its finale in 1949 with Communist victory and foundation of the People’s Republic of China, and the Nationalist retreat to Taiwan.
From Mao to Deng to Xi: WWII History as a Legitimacy Lever
When tracing the way successive Chinese leaderships utilized the history of WWII to promote its politics, we can identify three major periods: memory politics under Mao Zedong, its transformation during the so-called “reform and open-up” era pioneered by Deng Xiaoping, and the developments since 2012 till now – the Xi Jinping era. The interpretation of the events of WWII, just like its implications for contemporary politics, dramatically differ between these different time periods.
In the Mao Era, the war against Japan was depicted as a communist heroic epic, focusing on successful Mao-led guerrilla warfare engagements and anti-Japanese sabotages. This representation was to show that it was the Communist military might which “saved” China from extinction (and hence provided grounds for the CCP’s rule over the “New China”), and that its revolutionary spirit remained undefeated even when faced with a superior foreign opponent. It relied as much on the exaggeration of some parts of the history as it did on the exclusion of significant others. In this version of history, there was no space for the acknowledgement of the Nationalist effort, as including this aspect could have potentially jeopardized the Communist claim to rule. Simultaneously, this narrative did not include the atrocities suffered by the civilian population – doing that would have challenged the idea that the Communist forces successfully protected the Chinese people, while also disrupting the triumphant and victorious ode. It would have also run the danger of opening a pathway to drawing links between the atrocities of WWII and the unfolding Mao-led violence of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Finally, the omission of Japanese atrocities also served China’s international position, as the Communist government sought a diplomatic alliance with Japan and the Japanese recognition of its authority. In the Mao Era, therefore, the official discourse on the WWII experience was largely limited to highlighting the communist military epic.
In the 1980s this changed. Following Mao’s death, which marked the end of the violent and turbulent social turmoil known as the Cultural Revolution, the CCP found itself in a legitimacy crisis necessitating reform, if they were to maintain its leadership of China. The best-known changes associated with the post-Mao era, and particularly with the ascent of Deng Xiaoping as the supreme leader of China, are economic reforms and “opening up” of Chinese markets, which gave birth to “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
But memorialization of the WWII also changed, as the CCP eased restrictions on academic research and rehabilitated different social groups persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. Relations with Japan also deteriorated following the so-called “textbook controversy” in 1982. The previously silenced history of the atrocities thus started making their way into the official historical discourse, emphasizing Chinese victimhood in WWII. This narrative of victimhood emerged strongly alongside the triumphant reading of the war. The ideological focus on revolutionary communism was also progressively replaced by an ideological push for nationalism, which also allowed for the incorporation of the Nationalist war effort into the WWII discourse. “Chinese” identity was now prioritized over partisan allegiance. It was in this time in the 1980s that the major museums and memorial sites were built to commemorate the “Anti-Japanese War,” including the most prominent atrocity memorial museum in China – the Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders.
Sculpture titled "Family Ruined" located at the entrance to The Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders (Photo Credit: Markéta Bajgerová Verly)
Yet it was only in the aftermath of the brutal suppression of the student protests in Beijing in 1989, when the victimhood framing of WWII gained most traction. Following the Tiananmen crackdown, the CCP was again facing an existential challenge of losing legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of the disillusioned younger generation. The CCP leadership also felt that the youth had to be reminded of the struggles of China and decided to unite the divided public through launching a major Patriotic Education Campaign, in which WWII history represented a key element. It was at this moment that WWII history was most explicitly framed in terms of victimhood, narrating a tale of China reaching a point of extinction at the hands of a foreign invader with the intention of uniting the Chinese under the common banner of suffering. The slogan “Never Forget the National Humiliation” represented a historical master-narrative of modern China that included WWII as the key finale of the 100 years of Chinese subjugation at the hands of foreign powers, during which China reached the peak of its victimhood. The strengthening of this victimhood aspect, which would gain more traction than the triumphant elements, were represented in popular culture, education, but also in the museums. The previously mentioned Nanjing Massacre Memorial received a major expansion in 2007, including a new exhibition hall built to represent the shape of a sabre cutting through, rather literally, the Chinese land.
As Xi Jinping ascended to power in 2012, and China’s domestic and international standing took a different direction, the CCP-led WWII narrative transformed once again. The strong victimhood frame lost political traction, as it was no longer compatible with China’s growing international standing and particularly Xi Jinping’s vision to consolidate China as a global power. Instead of passive victimhood, the WWII narrative of the Xi Jinping Era was characterized in its early phase by a movement away from the strong representation of atrocities, instead painting China, again, first and foremost as the victor of the war. And importantly, not only as a victor of the war against Japan, but of the global WWII conflict. The new “national rejuvenation” narrative, which has replaced the discourse on “national humiliation”, positions China as a key member of the Allied club, newly emphasizing the international dimension of the conflict, as opposed to solely focusing on the domestic experience. Again, the history has been stretched and bent to fit this new frame. The current narrative presents a Sino-centric reading of the war, changing the official periodization of the war from 1937 to 1931, doubling the war years. This change, if historically questionable, is politically potent: by rolling back the clock to the year 1931, China can claim to have been fighting the “global war against fascism” longest, fiercest, and, importantly, 10 years longer than its major contemporary rival: the US.
2015, the year which marked 70 years since the conclusion of the hostilities, was a catalyst for this change. Again, we can look to the Nanjing Massacre Memorial for a fitting illustration. In 2015 the memorial museum complex unveiled a whole new exhibition hall that completely transformed the character of the memorial. The new museum is titled “Three Victories,” alluding to Xi Jinping’s rhetoric regarding the war, and is built in a shape that represents a rounded victory arch. Though located at the in-situ site of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial, built at the location of an excavated mass grave, the permanent exhibition of this new museum focuses not on the suffering but on the triumph of China during WWII, reminding the public that though the nation suffered, the war was eventually gloriously won. In the Xi Jinping Era, WWII represents the legitimacy of the CCP’s leadership not only domestically but globally, serving as a symbolic vessel for building the Xi Jinping-formulated “Community With A Shared Future For Mankind.”
The Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders annex "The Three Victories" (Photo Credit: Markéta Bajgerová Verly)
The 80th Anniversary: WWII Narrative and China in 2025
China’s memory politics regarding WWII is thus anything but static, and historical narratives transform in line with the CCP’s agendas and global developments. The year 2025 has marked the 80th anniversary of the war, and again, the narrative frame appears to be transforming, reflecting Xi Jinping’s contemporary ambitions, stakes, and alliances. As the relations between China and Russia gain further traction, the official WWII narrative now prominently highlights the wartime Sino-Soviet cooperation, previously mentioned only alongside other “international partners”. Prior to his visit to Russia in May 2025, Xi Jinping issued a special contribution to the Russian Gazette, in which he explicated that the “we must uphold a correct historical perspective on WWII.” This, according to Xi, implies an understanding that China and Russia were the principal theatres of the war, which decided the victorious outcome. Xi further reiterated that any “attempts at defamation” are bound to fail as “neither of our two nations will tolerate any act to reverse the course of history.” This clear placing of the “Sino-Soviet” significance at the forefront of the WWII discourse and declaring that it was thanks to these nations that the war was won creates a justification for China and Russia’s claim to drive current global developments.
Interestingly, it appears that the focus on atrocities, after being pushed into the background for the 70th anniversary, is experiencing a comeback. Earlier this year, a Chinese blockbuster movie “Dead to Rights” produced by the government’s Central Publicity Department’s China Film Group Corporation entered cinemas, dealing with the topic of the Nanjing Massacre. Harrowing and brutally explicit, the movie brings to life the well-known historical photographs of atrocities committed in Nanjing during the winter of 1937/1938, and therefore intensely communicates Chinese suffering at the hands of Japanese imperial army. The victimhood/victory scale is again rolling back to a more equal balance in representation. Arguably, one explanation could relate back to the previously noted unifying aspect – in 2025 the Chinese society still processes the collective trauma of the “Zero Covid” policy paired up with growing youth unemployment and economic stagnation.
That said, rather than the previously exclusively inward facing “national humiliation” discourse, the current atrocity focus also points outwards. “Dead to Rights” has been launched not only to Chinese audiences but has since premiered in many different countries across the globe including the US, Australia, Russia, South Korea, the UK, Germany, Singapore, and France, signalling Chinese suffering during the war to the world. One of the possible interpretations of the underlying political message is China’s recent strategic interest in appealing to the countries in the so-called “Global South” and bridging relations over the message of a common past, highlighting China’s own past encounters with colonial violence. China’s communication strategy is presenting an interesting bridging of an at first-glance oxymoronic combination of great power politics and postcolonial discourses – paving the way for China’s self-positioning as a “moral great power.”
At the time of the 80th anniversary, WWII memory has once again been updated to promote the current version of CCP leadership’s politics. The newly revamped and radically expanded exhibition at the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression Museum in Beijing, the most comprehensive WWII history museum in China, explicitly frames the CCP’s understanding of connecting present and future. The new exhibition titled "Remembering History, Commemorating the Martyrs, Cherishing Peace, and Creating the Future,” explicitly posits WWII as a means towards bolstering China’s current geopolitical role. In many ways, this connects directly to the core CCP guiding principles, now embodied in Xi Jinping’s Thought. One of the 14 leading “commitments” states that the CCP strives to “establish a common destiny between the Chinese people and other peoples around the world” with a "peaceful international environment," directly paraphrasing the exhibition’s title and reminding us of the important role of history in CCP’s core ideological visions. As this paper demonstrated, establishing a “common destiny” often materializes through establishment of a “common past.” However, the shape a common destiny and future take is always, and not only in China, a product of the acute political present.
Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression located in Beijing (Photo credit: Markéta Bajgerová Verly)
Markéta Bajgerová Verly is a political scientist focusing on the memory politics of East Asia and the globalization of memory. Recently, she was a fellow at the Vienna Wiesenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies leading research on the memory politics of Shanghai Jewish Refugees in China and Austria. She holds a PhD from the University of Vienna in which she focused on World War II museums in contemporary China. Her PhD research was conducted within the ERC project "Globalized Memorial Museums" at the Austrian Academy of Sciences. In 2020, she obtained an MA degree in China Studies (Politics and International Relations) from Yenching Academy at Peking University. In China, she led a Dean's Grant project mapping 30 museums across different Chinese provinces devoted to the memory of the War of Resistance against Japan and its memory politics. She holds an undergraduate degree from the University of Glasgow in Politics and History and previously was associated with the Institute of International Relations in Prague.
